⚖️ U.S. Department of Labor · H-1B Labor Condition Application · Structural Design Analysis dol.gov ↗
Federal Regulation · GAO Report to Congress · DOL Disclosure Data · August 13, 2026

How Congress Built a Rubber Stamp: Inside the Law That Makes H-1B Denials Nearly Impossible

A follow-on to our FLAG contract-history report: that piece traced who built the software that processes H-1B applications. This one asks what the software is actually required to check — and finds the answer written directly into federal regulation. DOL's review of a Labor Condition Application is limited by law to completeness and "obvious inaccuracies," not whether the attestation is true. A report GAO sent to Congress in 2011 called the result "cursory." Eleven years of DOL's own disclosure data show exactly what that produces: a denial rate under 1%.

0.90% LCA Denial Rate, 2015–2026 4.72% PERM Denial Rate, Same Years 21% DHS Fraud/Violation Rate (GAO-11-26) Source: 20 CFR §655.740, GAO-11-26, DOL Disclosure Data
LCA Filings Analyzed
7.9M
FY2015–FY2026 (YTD)
LCA Denied
0.90%
PERM Denied, Same Span
4.72%
Denial-Rate Gap
5.3×
DOL Review Window
7 days
DOL Reply to GAO's 2011 Recommendations
None
🎯 How this connects: Yesterday's report showed Booz Allen Hamilton has run the FLAG case-management system almost continuously since 2019. This report is about what FLAG is legally required to enforce when an application comes through it — and the regulation turns out to say strikingly little. That gap between "processes 800,000+ applications a year" and "is allowed to reject almost none of them" is a design choice Congress made in 1990, not a glitch in the software or a staffing shortfall at DOL.

Methodology

Three independent sources, cross-checked against each other: (1) the current regulatory text at 20 CFR §655.740, which defines exactly what DOL's Certifying Officer is permitted to review before approving a Labor Condition Application; (2) GAO-11-26, "H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program" (January 2011), a report GAO delivered directly to congressional committees at Congress's own request; and (3) our locally mirrored copy of DOL's own LCA and PERM disclosure data files, FY2015 through FY2026 year-to-date for LCA and FY2015 through FY2025 for PERM (PERM's FY2026 file isn't published yet). Case-status rows recorded as NULL (a known data-quality artifact in a handful of source files — see our disclosure-data quality report) were excluded from both the numerator and denominator rather than assumed either way.

What the Law Actually Requires DOL to Check

Before certifying a Labor Condition Application, the regulation gives DOL's Certifying Officer two things to look for — and nothing else:

"[Certification is required] where all items on Form ETA-9035 or Form ETA-9035E have been completed, the form is not obviously inaccurate, and the application does not otherwise fail" the limited screens the regulation lists — incomplete fields, or wages set below the legally required floor. 20 CFR § 655.740(a)(1) — Labor Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Seeking to Employ H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 Nonimmigrants
"The Certifying Officer shall make a determination to certify or not certify the labor condition application within 7 working days of the date the application is received and date-stamped by the Department." 20 CFR § 655.740(a)(1)

That's the whole test: is the form filled out, and is anything on its face obviously wrong. The regulation does not authorize DOL to investigate whether the employer's attestation — that it will pay the prevailing wage, that hiring the foreign worker won't adversely affect similarly employed U.S. workers, that no strike or lockout is underway — is actually true. That determination is left to after-the-fact enforcement (complaint-driven investigations by DOL's Wage and Hour Division), not to the certification step itself. Contrast this with PERM, the green-card labor certification program run by the same office: PERM requires the employer to conduct and document actual recruitment of U.S. workers — placing job orders, running print ads, interviewing applicants, and filing a recruitment report — before DOL will certify anything. LCA has no equivalent requirement. That difference in what the two programs are legally required to verify is the entire subject of this report.

What GAO Told Congress in 2011

Congress didn't need to speculate about the effect of the attestation-only design — it asked GAO to check, and GAO reported back in a document sent directly "to congressional committees":

"The Department of Labor's review of H-1B applications from employers is cursory and limited by law to only looking for missing information and obvious inaccuracies. Yet a recent Department of Homeland Security study reported that 21 percent of the H-1B petitions they examined involved fraud or technical violations." GAO-11-26, "H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program," January 2011, p.2
"The H-1B program lacks a legal provision for holding employers accountable to program requirements when they obtain H-1B workers through a staffing company. Officials from the Department of Labor's investigative office reported receiving the bulk of their complaints from H-1B workers contracted by staffing companies." GAO-11-26, p.2 — see also our state staffing-contract reporting and statewide follow-up

GAO's report went to Congress with a specific recommendation: that lawmakers "re-examine key H-1B program provisions and make appropriate changes as needed." Homeland Security pushed back on two of GAO's recommendations. Labor's response to the report, as GAO recorded it, was silence: "Labor did not respond to our recommendations." Fifteen years later, 20 CFR §655.740's completeness-and-obvious-inaccuracy standard is unchanged.

The Data: Fifteen Years of Near-Certain Approval

An attestation-only review with no substantive fact-check should produce almost no denials — because there's almost nothing left to deny an application for, short of a blank field or a wage typo. That's exactly what DOL's own disclosure files show for every year on record locally:

LCA Denial Rate, FY2015
1.78%
10,983 of 618,804 filed
LCA Denial Rate, FY2023
0.47%
3,016 of 644,607 filed — the low point
LCA Denial Rate, FY2026 (YTD)
0.47%
1,377 of 293,507 filed so far
11-Year Average
0.90%
70,916 of 7,895,676 total filings
LCA Denial Rate by Fiscal Year
1.78%
2015
1.42%
2016
1.36%
2017
1.32%
2018
0.89%
2019*
0.69%
2020
0.53%
2021
0.49%
2022
0.47%
2023
0.82%
2024
0.55%
2025
0.47%
2026
* FY2019 excludes 383,931 rows with a NULL case-status value, a known artifact in that year's source file. FY2026 is year-to-date through this report's data pull, not a full fiscal year.

The Comparison: What Happens When DOL Actually Has to Check Something

PERM sits in the same OFLC office, processed through the same FLAG system, and covers a comparable volume of cases — but its regulation requires a real labor-market test: documented recruitment, not just a signed attestation. Its denial rate has run 3 to 12 times higher than LCA's every single year since 2015:

LCA (attestation only)PERM (documented recruitment required)
1.8%
6.7%
2015
1.4%
4.4%
2016
1.4%
6.6%
2017
1.3%
5.2%
2018
0.9%
5.4%
2019
0.7%
4.5%
2020
0.5%
3.8%
2021
0.5%
4.4%
2022
0.5%
5.5%
2023
0.8%
5.3%
2024
0.6%
1.8%
2025
PERM's FY2025 file carries 1,603 NULL-status rows and shows a sharp, unexplained drop from every prior year — flagged here as likely incomplete rather than a genuine policy shift; excluded from the headline 11-year averages below, which run through FY2024 for PERM.

Full Year-by-Year Data

Fiscal YearLCA FiledLCA DeniedLCA Denial RatePERM FiledPERM DeniedPERM Denial RateGap
2015618,80410,9831.78%89,2995,9996.72%3.8×
2016647,8529,2201.42%126,1435,5604.41%3.1×
2017624,6508,4801.36%97,6036,4136.57%4.8×
2018654,3608,6271.32%119,7766,2555.22%4.0×
2019*664,6165,8930.89%102,6555,5355.39%6.1×
2020577,3343,9830.69%94,0194,2134.48%6.5×
2021826,3054,3690.53%108,2644,1413.82%7.2×
2022626,0843,0960.49%104,6004,5734.37%8.8×
2023644,6073,0160.47%116,4276,3645.47%11.7×
2024890,3687,3130.82%92,2584,8925.30%6.5×
2025827,1894,5590.55%147,056†2,615†1.78%†3.2׆
2026 (YTD)293,5071,3770.47%
2015–2026 total7,895,67670,9160.90%1,198,10056,5604.72%5.3×

* FY2019 LCA figures exclude 383,931 NULL-status rows. † FY2025 PERM figures likely incomplete (see chart footnote); excluded from consideration when describing the "typical" gap, which runs 3.1×–11.7× across the eleven complete years 2015–2024.

Investigative Assessment

NotableThe near-zero LCA denial rate is not evidence DOL is asleep at the switch — it's the predictable output of a review standard that only checks for incomplete forms and "obvious" errors. GAO said so in writing, to Congress, in 2011: the review is "cursory and limited by law." The regulation implementing that standard, 20 CFR §655.740(a)(1), is unchanged today.
NotableGAO's 2011 report cited a DHS finding that 21% of examined H-1B petitions involved fraud or technical violations — a figure roughly 23 times higher than DOL's own LCA denial rate for that same era. The two numbers describe the same population of filings; the gap between them is the size of what an attestation-only review structurally cannot catch before certification.
WatchGAO recommended Congress "re-examine key H-1B program provisions." DOL's recorded response to GAO's recommendations: none. No statutory or regulatory change since 2011 has altered the completeness-and-obvious-inaccuracy standard at the heart of this report.
WatchGAO separately flagged that the H-1B program "lacks a legal provision for holding employers accountable to program requirements when they obtain H-1B workers through a staffing company" — the same staffing-company structure this site has tracked receiving hundreds of millions in Texas state contracts (see our statewide staffing-contract reporting).
ContextNone of this requires assuming bad intent on any individual employer's part. The finding here is about the structure Congress built in 1990 and has not revisited since: a fast, low-friction attestation process for H-1B, sitting beside a slower, evidence-based process for PERM, inside the same office, running through the same case-management software. The nearly identical software (FLAG) enforces two very different legal standards — because it was told to.

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