H-1B Guest Workers Inside the
VA Austin IT Center

1. Executive Summary

The VA Austin Information Technology Center (AITC), located at 1615 Woodward Street and 7600 Metropolis Drive, Austin, TX, is the hub of the Department of Veterans Affairs' national IT operations. It runs systems containing health records, financial data, payroll, and benefit eligibility information for millions of American veterans.

Analysis of FY2026 Q1-Q2 H-1B Labor Condition Application data from the U.S. Department of Labor reveals that 13 separate IT staffing firms have filed H-1B visa applications naming the Department of Veterans Affairs as the worksite employer at Austin, TX addresses. These filings cover 15 documented worker positions with an annualized wage total of $1,463,213 — wages that could otherwise employ American IT professionals in Central Texas.

More significantly, at least 3 of these vendors — or their direct successors in the contracting chain — are the same entities documented in a 2015 federal Inspector General investigation that found unauthorized access to VA systems from China and India, systemic security failures, and a culture of indifference to cyber threats. The vendor relationships have continued for over a decade.

The data also reveals two previously unreported patterns. First, Computer Global Solutions filed three separate LCA applications routing through a new intermediary, Tria Federal Company — the SMS→TEKsystems structure from 2015, updated with a new name in the middle. Second, a firm called Avco Consulting explicitly labels its H-1B worksite as "The Department of Veterans Affairs - IT Center (Remote Work Location)" — precisely the remote access scenario the 2015 investigation found led to unauthorized international network access.

2. What the VA Austin IT Center Controls

Contract records from the OIG investigation describe AITC as the corporate IT center for VA's nationwide systems, supporting mission-critical functions through approximately 200 complex applications and over 2,000 physical and virtual servers. Systems managed from this Austin facility include:

• Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) Data Warehouse — financial and eligibility records for all veterans
• VBA Corporate Applications, Health Data Repository — medical and claims records
• My HealtheVet (MHV) — the primary veteran health portal used by millions
• Loan Guaranty Service (LGY) — VA home loan processing
• Payroll, human resources, logistics, and supply chain systems for all of VA
• IT services for several other federal agencies beyond the VA

All IT hiring decisions affecting these systems are made from Austin. There is no distributed hiring pathway — no posting in Kerrville, San Antonio, or anywhere in the Hill Country. The pipeline starts and ends at AITC, controlled by a subcontractor network.

3. The 2015 OIG Investigation

VA OIG Report No. 13-01730-159, published April 13, 2015, was titled: Administrative Investigation — Improper Access to the VA Network by VA Contractors from Foreign Countries, Office of Information and Technology, Austin, TX.

Key Findings of the Investigation

The 2015 Contractor Chain

The OIG report identified a specific multi-layer subcontracting structure. This is the exact same structure visible in current 2025–2026 LCA data — different names in the middle, identical pattern.

4. Current H-1B Filings: Austin IT Cluster (FY2026 Q1-Q2)

The following table presents all H-1B LCA filings from DOL/OFLC data where the Department of Veterans Affairs is the disclosed worksite employer in Austin, TX (ZIP codes 78741 and 78744 — the AITC campus) or where the filing explicitly names VA as the remote worksite. Data period: October 2025 – March 2026.

OIG Vendor or related entity documented in VA OIG Report 13-01730-159 (2015)   Withdrawn Filing was certified then withdrawn   ×3 Same FEIN, three separate filings   Level I = entry (17th pctl) · II = experienced · III = qualified   Case numbers abbreviated; prefix I-200 omitted. Source: DOL/OFLC ETA-9035 FY2026 Q1-Q2.

The $114,754 Wage Floor — Coordinated or Coincidental?

Five separate, ostensibly unrelated companies — Taproot Solutions, Infrapod Technologies, Stier Solutions, Rigas Technologies, and others — all filed LCAs for exactly $114,754 per year. This is not a round number. It is the DOL prevailing wage determination for a Level II Software Developer in the Austin-Round Rock MSA. Every company arrived at the identical wage to the dollar.

The effect: this H-1B minimum becomes the effective ceiling, not the floor. A qualified American developer in Austin with five years of experience should command $125,000–$145,000. The prevailing wage requirement signals to the procurement system that $114,754 is the approved rate — suppressing what American workers could negotiate.

Tria Federal Company: The New Intermediary

Computer Global Solutions (FEIN 38-3457333) filed three separate LCA applications listing different variations of the secondary entity field — but all pointing to the same thing:

• "Department of Veterans Affairs through Tria Federal Company"
• "Department of Veterans Affairs (Through Tria Federal Company)."
• "Tria Federal Company (project for the Department of Veterans Affairs)"

Same FEIN, same $115,000 wage, same Austin 78744 address. Tria Federal is a newer government IT contractor not present in the 2015 OIG report — a new prime inserted between VA and the staffing sub-vendor. Same structure, new name at the middle layer.

National Pattern: Other VA H-1B IT Placements

DREVOL and Team-Soft in DC: Two separate companies, same attorney (Bhanu Ilindra), exactly $106,912 each, same VA client, same SAS Administrator category. The $114,754 Austin wage-coordination pattern replicated identically in Washington DC.

5. Vendor Continuity: The Same Networks, a Decade Later

Taproot Solutions, Inc. — 2013 to 2025

In the 2015 OIG report: Taproot Solutions appears as a sub-vendor within the SMS/TEKsystems contracting chain at AITC. Task order records confirmed Taproot personnel were placed at the VA facility under the $715 million DCAT4 contract.

In FY2026 Q1-Q2 data: Taproot Solutions, Inc. (taproot-solutions.com, FEIN 46-1097863) filed an H-1B LCA for a Software Developer at 7600 Metropolis Drive, Austin TX 78744 — the AITC campus — for $114,754, with attorney Dimitar Michailov. Status: Certified. Case: I-200-25307-359929.

VEN Solutions LLC — Remote for VA, Again

In the 2015 OIG report: The investigation documented VEN Solutions LLC (VENSOLVE.COM) employees working remotely. The OIG found that remote H-1B workers at AITC did access VA systems from foreign countries, with one worker leaving a computer in China containing VA credentials.

In FY2026 Q1-Q2 data: VEN Solutions LLC (FEIN 26-3926825) filed an H-1B LCA for a Java Developer listed as "REMOTELY WORKING FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS" — Irving, TX. Case: I-200-25322-418825, Certified. $77,418/year. The word "remotely" appears in the official LCA filing itself.

The Attorney Network: Structural Evidence

6. The Exclusion of American Workers in Central Texas

Kerrville, Texas sits 60 miles northwest of San Antonio and approximately 100 miles from Austin. The Hill Country corridor — Kerrville, Comfort, Fredericksburg, Boerne — has a high concentration of military veterans, veteran family members, and former military IT personnel with exactly the skills required for AITC roles: Unix/Linux system administration, software development, database administration, network security. These are skills taught at Fort Sam Houston, Lackland AFB, and Goodfellow AFB in San Angelo.

Wage Displacement Analysis

The median household income in Kerrville, TX is approximately $52,000. A single Software Developer position at $114,754 represents more than twice the local median household income. These 15 positions represent an annual payroll that, if employed locally, would be a substantial economic injection into Kerr County and the surrounding Hill Country.

7. Security Implications: Unresolved Risks

The 2015 OIG report did not merely document administrative failures. It documented active national security risks: contractor employees with administrator-level access to systems containing data on millions of veterans, accessing those systems from China on personally-owned equipment, over networks monitored by the Chinese government. The current data raises unresolved questions:

• VEN Solutions LLC is still filing H-1B LCAs for workers listed as "REMOTELY WORKING FOR" the VA. The 2015 OIG established that remote H-1B workers at AITC did access VA systems from foreign countries. Has VA audited whether current remote H-1B workers are accessing systems internationally?
• Avco Consulting explicitly labels its VA work as "Remote Work Location." What background investigation level applies to this worker? What system access do they have?
• Computer Global Solutions is routing through Tria Federal — a newer intermediary. The 2015 investigation found the CO and COR were unaware of sub-vendor workers until the OIG investigated. Are Tria Federal's sub-vendors subject to the same security vetting as prime contractor employees?
• The OIG found that a forensics examination in 2014 was incomplete and did not examine the personal computers used to access VA systems. No evidence exists in the public record that a comprehensive follow-up audit was ever completed.

8. Assessment

9. Recommendations

For Congress and Oversight Bodies

• Request a full accounting from the VA CIO of all H-1B sub-vendor employees currently with access to AITC systems — their access levels, background investigation status, and whether any are accessing VA systems remotely from international locations.
• Ask the VA Inspector General for a follow-up review of OIG Report 13-01730-159 — specifically whether Recommendations 2, 3, and 4 (action against SMS, policy revision, training revision) were fully implemented, and whether the vendor ecosystem has meaningfully changed.
• Request DOL enforcement review of LCA filings where the same prevailing wage appears across multiple ostensibly unrelated companies (the $114,754 cluster in Austin; the $106,912 cluster in DC).
• Examine whether SDVOSB and veteran-owned set-aside vehicles are channeling work to H-1B staffing pipelines rather than employing American veterans in IT roles — the stated purpose of those set-asides.

For VA Contracting Officers

• Require disclosure of all sub-vendor H-1B personnel in VA IT task orders. The 2015 OIG found the CO and COR were unaware of sub-vendor workers until the investigation.
• Require documented domestic recruitment — USAJOBS postings, evidence American applicants were considered — before approving H-1B sub-vendor placements at AITC.
• Require all remote H-1B workers with AITC system access to certify quarterly that they have not accessed VA systems from outside the United States.

For American Workers and the Public

• File FOIA requests with VA for current contractor employee rosters at AITC, including employer of record and visa status.
• Contact members of the Senate and House Veterans' Affairs Committees with this data, requesting hearings on H-1B contractor use in VA IT infrastructure.
• Submit formal public comments to DOL when H-1B LCAs are posted for VA worksites — the public access file for each LCA is available for comment.

Sources & Methodology

• H-1B LCA Data: U.S. Department of Labor, OFLC, Form ETA-9035, FY2026 Q1 & Q2 (October 2025 – March 2026), via GuestWorkerVisas.com database. 40 unique cases reviewed; 15 identified as IT staffing at VA Austin facilities.
• OIG Report: VA Office of Inspector General, Administrative Investigation, Improper Access to the VA Network by VA Contractors from Foreign Countries, OIT, Austin, TX — Report No. 13-01730-159, April 13, 2015. Public record.
• Methodology: Records queried on secondary entity containing "veterans." Deduplicated on CASE_NUMBER. Wages annualized (hourly × 2,080). Medical/research filings (physicians, residents, research associates) separated from IT staffing filings. FEIN matching used to identify related entities. Vendor names compared against OIG report text for continuity analysis.
• This report presents official government data and makes no allegation of illegal conduct by any individual or company. All LCA filings described are legal filings with the U.S. Department of Labor. The questions raised are policy questions, not criminal accusations.